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Abstract
Discourses of ‘neuroplasticity’ have become increasingly apparent in the neurosciences and wider society. 
These connect with broader narratives about the ‘changing brain’ throughout the life-course. Here, we 
explore their presence in the talk of a range of publics. Their presence is indicative of how novel neuroscience 
is accepted, or not, by our participants. In particular, we suggest that any acceptance of the science relates to 
their personal and/or professional experiences of change (to their own or others’ subjectivities) rather than 
to some intrinsic and widely-held significance of scientific concepts per se. Accordingly, we also submit that 
it is in part through the congruence of some neuroscientific claims to everyday experiences and perspectives 
that the former are rendered legible and salient. In this respect, ‘lay’ knowledge has considerable import for 
the wider cultural authorisation of that of ‘experts’.
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1. Introduction
Over the last decade, the concept of neuro- or brain ‘plasticity’ has become increasingly resonant in 
international neuroscience research. Whilst scientific discourse is divergent in its deployment of 
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‘plasticity’, this term can be broadly understood as the potential for “changes in the input of any 
neural system, or in the targets or demands of its efferent connections, [to] lead to system reorgani-
zation that might be demonstrable at the level of behavior, anatomy, and physiology and down to the 
cellular and molecular levels” (Pascual-Leone et al., 2005: 377–378). The plastic brain is thus 
framed as a dynamic network, the very nature of which is moulded through subjective experience.
The idea that the developing brain in childhood is malleable or plastic has a long history within 
the neurosciences. Today, studies have been regarded as demonstrating neurogenesis – the growth 
of new neurones – in animals and adult humans (see Gage, 2002 and references therein). Regarded 
by some as “a conceptual event (indeed, a conceptual scandal)” (Rees, 2010: 153), the degree to 
which all areas of the brain can be thought of as plastic is still contentious. Yet, there is a growing 
scientific consensus that plasticity is a widespread and important feature of the human brain. 
Within narratives of plasticity, the brain and its environment are taken to mutually shape each other 
both in childhood and across adult life. This has led to speculation from a range of communities 
about the degree to which ‘traditional’ distinctions between nature and nurture are dissolving, and 
new possibilities for both therapy and enhancement opening up (Rubin, 2009).
Within (at least) Europe and North America, a plethora of books, media articles, blogs and other 
cultural products today draw explicitly or indirectly on the new discourses of brain plasticity in their 
exhortations to ‘use it or lose it’ and ‘keep your brain fit’. One much discussed technique relating to 
the idea that the structure and/or function of the brain is changeable is ‘brain training’; this is gener-
ally understood as mental exercises that are regarded by some as being able to improve brain func-
tioning. A range of devices, exercises and programmes continue to be promoted as a means of 
improving memory, enhancing cognition, tackling psychiatric disorders, and combating neurode-
generation (Brenninkmeijer, 2010). Yet, ‘brain training’ has been the subject of much controversy, 
with many neuroscientists condemning it as unproven and based on an exaggerated understanding 
of the degree of plasticity the human brain possesses (e.g. Owen et al., 2010). Nevertheless, games 
designers and science writers (such as Norman Doidge, author of the 2007 book, The Brain that 
Changes Itself: Stories of Personal Triumph from the Frontiers of Brain Science), represent the 
concept of brain plasticity to wider publics as novel and exciting. In so doing, commentators and the 
producers of cultural products set out the implications of recent scientific work on brain plasticity 
for a range of health and social issues, including education, learning, ageing, mental health, sexual-
ity and rehabilitation, commonly situating claims within the language of personal liberation.
Some social scientists and other commentators have already cast their gaze upon these dis-
courses of the changing brain. As Choudhury and McKinney (2013) note, ideas about plasticity 
have also become intertwined with concerns within civil society about the developing brain and the 
(over-)use of digital media by children and adolescents. In the UK, where ideas about the changing 
brain and childhood have collided in social policy agendas (see Allen, 2011), considerable ire has 
been evoked in some quarters, with accusations being levelled at policymakers that they have been 
‘blinded by neuroscience’ (Wastell and White, 2012). In the work of Pitts-Taylor (2010) and 
Thornton (2011), the concept and popularisation of plasticity in particular has been diagnosed as 
symptomatic of broader neoliberal agendas that seek to create and order ever more diligent sub-
jects, who can today self-govern at the level of the neurological itself. Other social theoretical 
accounts of plasticity have underscored the potential of this idea for more liberatory forms of 
praxis (Malabou, 2008; Papadopoulos, 2011).
It is, however, unclear to what extent ideas about the changing brain are finding traction and 
salience within the everyday worlds of those who are perhaps likely to be most affected by them. 
As Wall (2010) shows, related discourses of brain development can evoke responses ranging from 
anxiety to scepticism in the mothers of young children. Conversely, the work of Elizabeth Fein 
(2012) has examined situations within which ideas of neurological fixity – not plasticity – structure 
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practice and which can be put to use for various moral and economic ends. This is suggestive of the 
diversity of public engagements with scientific discourses of brain changes that might be expected 
(and which has been shown through media analysis with regards to neuroscientific images, for 
instance; Whiteley, 2012). Drawing on UK focus group data as part of a project on the social and 
ethical dimensions of neuroscience, we begin here to cast further light on what notions of a chang-
ing brain manifest within publics’ discourses, and in what ways. In so doing, we seek to avoid the 
more “polemical” claims that have been argued to be present within “discussions about the cultural 
significance of neuroscience” (O’Connor and Joffe, 2013: 256).
Mindful of the cautions of O’Connor and Joffe (2013), and without wishing to take for granted 
the significance of scientific discourses on the changing brain (even as we recognise its cultural 
resonance), we thus take analytic cues from a different range of literatures. Firstly, we draw on 
key ideas from studies of the public understanding of science; in particular, work that has shown 
the centrality of social identities and social location in directing people’s interest in, reception of, 
and engagement with scientific knowledge (Kerr et al., 1998; Michael, 1992; Wynne, 1992). 
Secondly, we find instructive sociological and philosophical investigations around individuals’ 
embodied experiences of health and illness (Bury, 1991; Busby et al., 1997; Leder, 1990; 
Monaghan, 1999; Prior, 2003). This research points both to patients’ (shifting) conceptualisa-
tions of bodies and biomedicine as illness progresses, and to the distinct understandings of dis-
ease and risk that may be evident between physicians and ‘lay’ people. Finally, we are motivated 
by scholarship around the historical and cultural foundations for the ‘neuroscientific turn’ 
(Littlefield and Johnson, 2012) that has been documented in various social and epistemic prac-
tices (Pickersgill, 2013; Stadler, 2012; Vidal, 2009). Such work is indicative of the degree to 
which the widely-held ‘novelty’ of neuroscience (including by some social scientists) is in fact 
itself socially-situated and (co-)produced.
2. Methods
This paper draws on data collected for an Economic and Social Research Council funded study 
aimed at better understanding the place and role of neuroscience in society (Principal Investigator: 
Cunningham-Burley; Co-Investigators: Pickersgill and Martin). More specifically, the research 
sought to determine what neuroscientists, patients and professionals who might in some way use 
neurologic research judged to be the benefits and risks of neuroscience; analyse how moral and 
ethical valences are ascribed to new social developments occasioned by neuroscientific research; 
and explore what rights and responsibilities publics perceive themselves and others to have in 
relationship to the implications of neuroscience. Our aim was to produce reflective research that 
could contribute to ongoing conversations playing out within sociology and anthropology around 
science–society relationships (such as those summarised above). As interpretative sociologists, we 
make suggestions based on and draw reflections from our data, with the goal of producing indica-
tive (rather than definitive) claims that augment sociological theorisation.
Our methodological approach reflected these scholarly aims. We conducted 16 small focus 
groups with a range of participants (cf. Kerr et al., 1998). This method allows for participants to 
ask one another questions, further enriching the discussion through the fuller development and 
substantiation of arguments and positions (and the expression of challenges and ambivalence). 
Each group contained three to five individuals (with an overall total of 57 participants); the small 
size of the groups encouraged all members to engage, enabling rich and in-depth discussion. 
Groups were organised along different biosocial lines (ensuring that a particular social identity was 
shared by each member of a particular group): patient groups (two from an epilepsy organisation, 
two from a head injury organisation and one from a dementia organisation), neuroscientists (six), 
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and specific professional groups whose beliefs and practices may be affected by new developments 
in brain research (based on our knowledge of the professional discourses that we had monitored as 
part of the wider research project). These were one each of teachers, counsellors, foster care work-
ers, CBT (cognitive behavioural therapy) therapists, and clergy.
As has been shown in other work on biomedicine and society (Haddow et al., 2008; Kerr 
et al., 1998, 2007), many members of ‘the public’ have diverse interests in and knowledge of 
science. Recognising this, and mindful of our research questions, we deliberately sought to 
conduct focus groups in England and Scotland with social groups that might already have an 
interest in neuroscience. To this end, we also included neuroscientists, with the understanding 
(based in part on Cunningham-Burley’s experience of researching biomedicine and society) 
that scientists themselves are ‘publics’ for research that is situated outside their very specific 
areas of expertise.
Focus groups were recruited via targeted emails to individuals (including patient group staff), 
and organised either by a key informant or by Pickersgill. Recruitment letters emphasised that the 
research was a focus group study looking at the social and ethical aspects of neuroscience, and to 
non-scientists it was stated that prior knowledge of neuroscience was not a pre-requisite for partici-
pation. Pickersgill convened all groups, which took place at the University of Edinburgh, at a meet-
ing place such as charitable offices or a community centre (for all patient groups), or at a place of 
work. Ethics clearance was granted by the University of Edinburgh.
Our focus groups were semi-structured, in order to maximise interaction between members. 
Questions revolved around rights and responsibilities of neuroscientists, and the import of neuro-
science for wider society. Scientists were also queried specifically about how they framed the eth-
ics of neuroscientific research; patients regarding whether they would ever participate in 
neuroscientific studies; and professionals about any significance neuroscience might hold to their 
work. The purpose of these questions was to produce dialogue relevant to the research questions 
that was salient to the particular populations participating in each group. An A4 sheet of paper 
labelled ‘What is Neuroscience?’ was presented to each participant at the start of the dialogue as a 
vignette to help foster discussion.
In analysing this discussion data, our approach was twofold. First, we were concerned to exam-
ine the data for themes that spoke directly to our research questions (as described above; see 
Pickersgill et al., 2011; Pickersgill, 2012). Second, a more inductive approach was used to locate 
themes within the data that were not central to our initial concerns, but which nevertheless appeared 
salient within the corpus. Transcripts were read multiple times by Pickersgill, and inspected by 
Martin and Cunningham-Burley. Emergent themes were discussed between the authors, in order to 
locate ones that should be subject to further analysis. Both Pickersgill and Martin independently 
identified ‘the changing brain’ (i.e., the focus of this paper) as one such theme. The topic guide did 
not explicitly focus on ideas about changes in the brain across the life-course or neuroplasticity; 
talk spontaneously turned to these issues.
Pickersgill attended to this theme through further close readings of the transcripts, followed 
by manual coding of the material and its organisation into coherent sub-themes using Microsoft 
Word (which are indicated in the rest of this paper through the sub-headings, and which form 
the basis for the manuscript). During this process, the transcripts as a whole were continually 
referred back to, as a means of ensuring that the data and analysis presented here remained 
grounded in the particular context of the focus groups. This open analytic style thus involves 
reciprocal relating on the part of the authors between data themes, the data corpus, and wider 
empirical and conceptual sociological and anthropological literatures. As such, it produces 
scholarship that interprets the specificities of the data collected but which cannot, of course, be 
regarded as producing findings that can be taken to be necessarily representative of other 
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publics. The point, as noted above, is to produce sociological statements and conceptual claims, 
which can then be explored empirically by other investigators for different kinds of populations 
and issues.
In what follows, and in common with other sociological work in similar areas, we interweave 
our data and our interpretations of it in order to produce an analytic narrative of focus group discus-
sions of ‘the changing brain’. We conclude with a summation of and reflections on the empirical 
data and conceptual themes explored and interrogated herein. As will come more sharply into focus 
as this analysis unfolds, discourses of brain changes, of cerebral development and decline, resonate 
in important ways with the experiential (i.e., bodily and professional) knowledge of a variety of 
actors, with implications for our understandings of the societal instantiation of biomedical knowl-
edge regarded as novel.
3. The changing brain across the life-course
Experiences of change
Our participants appeared to view the brain as a “very, very complicated thing” (F1, epilepsy group 
1) which had complex and multifaceted relationships with behaviour and the rest of the body, and 
the functions of which could shift. This framing was most strikingly evident in the discussions 
between individuals suffering from the effects of conditions or events like epilepsy and stroke. 
These participants commonly discussed their neurological concerns from a life-course perspective, 
describing, for instance, the onset of dementia or seizures from a particular age, and the ways that 
brain function and incidences of neurological events changed over a lifetime. As one woman put it, 
“part of my brain had got worse” (F3, epilepsy group 2) once adulthood was reached.
Negative changes in the brain were related to and evidenced by deficiencies in subjective quali-
ties such as behaviours, interests or skills. For instance, one woman with epilepsy and who had 
suffered from cerebral aneurisms described how her “organisational skills are nowhere near what 
they used to be but, then again, they’re much better now than, you know, six, seven years ago” (F1, 
epilepsy group 1). Thus, whilst the brain might change for the worse, it may also, in time, improve 
to some extent. This narrative of loss and gain is most evident in the following extract:
I always said to my husband, “You know what,” I says, “I think they’ve moved a creative part of my brain 
somewhere” and he used to say, “What do you mean?” I used to be artistic, as in drawing, you know, 
sketching an’, you know, charcoals and things like that, I barely find that I can actually put pencil to paper, 
in that aspect anymore, but I can write poetry, stories, you know […] [A television programme said that] 
there can be a shift in the brain. (F1, epilepsy group 2)
Yet, for some respondents, changes to the brain were absolute and wholly negative. One older 
man, recalling the difference between his life before and after dementia became a problem for him, 
described how “lots of parts in your behaviour patterns are… changed, some mildly, some quite 
dramatically” (M1, dementia group). Another participant in this discussion described changes that 
were gradual, but which had profound effects on subjectivity:
I’m interested in the change, because I never noticed the change really, […] when it started, the only thing 
I noticed was I couldnae thread a needle, I couldnae paint or anything like that. (F1, dementia group)
The irreversibility of these changes was difficult to deal with, and necessitated the adoption of 
psychosocial “strategies” in order to live the best possible life:
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I would like to go back to what my life was before, I would love dearly to go back to what my life was 
before, but you can’t do that so you’ve got to say, well either I’m going to make this work for me in some 
way, I’m going to find some strategies in it, or I’m going to accept it and hide behind the net curtains in a 
kitchen and just stare out the window all day. (M1, dementia group)
On occasion, the origins of brain development and decline were reflected upon. Though remain-
ing embodied, this discourse departed in some ways from contemporary biomedical narratives of 
plasticity and those embedded within the promotion of ‘brain training’ games; instead, entities such 
as hormones were figured as drivers of change. As one woman with epilepsy reflected:
We moved […] seven years ago and I started having seizures. I think it’s to do with the time of my life as 
well because it all started in adolescence, and I’m having hormonal changes again now. (F1, epilepsy 
group 1)
Another woman described how “during my pregnancy I was seizure free”, but “they came back 
after I had my son. So there was some. But then every time I took my periods I always had sei-
zures” (F3, epilepsy group 1). The third female participant in the discussion likewise pondered 
“why the brain says ‘no pain, no suffering during pregnancy’” (F2, epilepsy group 1). In the second 
epilepsy focus group, one of the female participants also linked epilepsy to changes in the brain 
that were possibly “partially hormonal” (F1, epilepsy group 2) in origin.
In sum, many of our participants in patient groups employed a somatic vocabulary to frame and 
account for changes in their subjectivities and experience of health and illness over time. We might 
regard the use of neurological/neuroscientific terms in the talk quoted throughout this sub-section as 
an example of our participants constructing the science as ‘relevant’ (Schütz, 1946), which in some 
cases activates an interest in or orientation towards it (which we explore in more detail below).
The interest of brain science to patients
One of the first things that became clear from the research was that some of our respondents had 
an interest in neuroscience as a form of entertainment: they watched television programmes, read 
newspaper articles, and attended public lectures on brain research, and considered that some others 
might do the same, “Neurology is becoming exciting, it’s become consumable, you know? People 
want to know about it” (M1, dementia group). When introducing himself to his fellow participants, 
one focus group member said:
I’m dead interested in, in neuroscience, but more or less how the brain does recover and how people 
perceive people who have, who have had a head injury, stroke, brain injury. (M2, head injury group)
In this quote, M2 explicitly links his interest in brain science with his understandings of the brain 
as something that can “recover” – i.e., how it can change. This sub-section focuses on the talk of 
the minority of patients – and especially this participant – who were familiar with neuroscience 
prior to the focus groups in order to better explore how (dis)interest in it can be articulated.
Some participants felt that (neurobiological) research that helped to clarify their own experi-
ences of brain changes could be interesting or useful. When asked about the role of neuroscience 
in treatment for conditions like epilepsy, one participant responded that it should generate a
far deeper and more understanding of how the brain works and functions with regard to itself and the rest 
of the body, and the chemical changes that take place for various reasons. (F2, epilepsy group 2)
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After all, it was “amazing” that “a small change in chemistry” (F3, epilepsy group 2) could have 
profound effects both on the brain and on the sense of self.
As indicated above, M2 (head injury group) was especially interested in neuroscientific knowl-
edge pertaining to plasticity (and a particularly vocal participant regarding this within the focus 
group setting). However, for him, acceptance of the claims of scientists did not appear to rest on 
blind trust in experts so much as emerge from the experiential knowledge of having lived through 
a traumatic brain injury and noticing the gradual return of function:
Yeah, I mean, I’ve…articles, I went to a lecture, just last week, by this person called Norman Doidge. 
He’s an American psychologist, and what he’s doing a study on is in brain plasticity, and that’s how the 
brain reorganises itself. Because I had my, my accident twenty five years ago, and then it was very 
much one area did something, Broca’s brain, I think it did speech, and if you got that damaged you’d 
lose your speech; if you lose this bit, you’d lose that bit and I was told that I wouldn’t walk again, or I 
would for two years, but obviously I am now, and what this lad’s saying is that your lain – your brain! 
– your brain can be retrained. I mean, to me it’s blatantly obviously, because at one time I was paralysed 
from the neck down, so obviously, something’s happened up here. I mean, not a lot but, you know, so 
obviously something, so I’m very much in that thing that, a lot of the things that are coming up now 
are so obvious that I just don’t know why it hasn’t been us- what’s the word? Looked into more. (M2, 
head injury group)
Here, lived experience made it “blatantly obvious” that scientific ideas of brain plasticity were valu-
able in understanding recovery after trauma, and played an important role in validating this knowl-
edge. In other words, science helped make sense of prior experience and provided a framework for 
understanding the changing body – but science was itself authorised through this experience.
Interest in brain plasticity may, in part, reflect the hopeful aspect of this field of research: what 
Rubin (2009) might call its ‘therapeutic promise’ (see also Pickersgill, 2011) perhaps encourages a 
less critical appraisal than findings that imply less positive futures for neurology patients (who do not 
have a wide range of successful therapeutics on offer to them). Given this, hope of future improve-
ment is very significant and, we suggest, may be part of why Doidge has been so popular. Nonetheless, 
later in the discussion M2 also distanced himself from the more optimistic tropes of neuroplasticity:
M2:  What I think-I think it’s [neuroscience]…it’s very important, you know. But I 
also think it’s got to be monitored carefully because, I think, like this, this, this 
person who I went to see, he’s wrote a book called, ‘The Brain that Heals Itself’, 
and the first couple of chapters are about physical things like, sight, walking, 
etc., but then he starts going on to mental things, like, your habits, your… every-
thing, I mean, there’s a chapter on pornography and it’s just all about brain plas-
ticity and this person thinks that everything can be sorted or has something to do 
with this brain plasticity, and to me that’s just weird.
Pickersgill: Right, in what sense?
M2:  Well, I mean, it’s… it’s just so evangelical! You know, sort of, ‘everything shall 
be sorted out by this brain that is plastic’, and I’m thinking, but that’s nonsense, 
you know. As far as I was concerned he was just making up things to, sort of, he 
said-he was, sort of, like, grabbing something and going, yes it can be done; you 
know, ‘I hate my dog’; we can cure it with brain plasticity!
M2’s comments became more assertive as the focus group continued, with his final comment (and 
the final comment of the group discussion) appearing to express a sceptical attitude towards some 
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of the claims he perceived as evident in Doidge’s book: “It’s very interesting at the beginning, it’s 
incredibly interesting at the beginning, but towards the middle it just goes loonyville!”
We can interpret these statements in at least two, not incommensurable, ways. First, they can be 
regarded as a form of expectation management, wherein those living with long-term conditions 
reflexively guard themselves against optimism enjoined by therapeutic promising in order to pro-
tect themselves from possible disappointment (on chronic illness and trajectories of expectations, 
see Bury, 1991). Second, and perhaps more pertinently, they can be understood in terms of the 
knowledge non-scientists may possess about the institutions of science, including the fallibility of 
research and the hyping of claims, particularly in popular fora (cf. Kerr et al., 1998; Michael, 1992; 
Wynne, 1992).
Based on our data – as summarised in this sub-section and that which preceded it – we suggest 
that changes in the brain throughout the life-course were part of the experiential knowledge some 
of our participants had about their own bodies (cf. Busby et al., 1997; Monaghan, 1999). Cerebral 
changes, in both the long and short term, were understood to be generated by some other aspects 
of the body (i.e., hormones) or even the brain itself: note, for example, F2’s (epilepsy group 1) 
overall perspective that some part of the brain could self-regulate such that the subjective experi-
ence of pain would not be communicated to the embodied self. Participants’ experiential knowl-
edge seemed to rest upon an assumption that the brain is an object of ‘mundane significance’ 
(Pickersgill et al., 2011) with regards to many, if not all, aspects of health and subjectivity. This has 
been a key idea within ‘Western’ societies for several centuries, as Vidal (2009) elegantly shows. 
In some cases, taken-for-granted knowledge was deemed to be evidenced by sources as diverse as 
television programmes and medication advice; F1 (epilepsy group 1), for instance, described how 
a doctor informed her that one of the antiepileptic medications would counteract the effect of the 
contraceptive pill, indicating that “there’s something to do with hormones there. It’s-and especially 
the way I’ve been since, all my hormones have started going a bit AWOL.” Neurologic research, 
as encountered through popular media (for instance), may also have had an important explanatory 
and legitimating function for our participants to make further sense of their personal perspectives. 
In the next section, we continue this discussion of the changing brain through (primarily) data from 
our focus groups with different professionals.
4. The changing brain in professional practice
The interest of brain science to professionals
The interest in, and explanatory and legitimatory function of, scientific ideas around the (changing) 
brain that was evident within the narratives of some patients was also apparent in the focus groups 
with professionals. Perhaps reflecting recent policy initiatives around children’s brains (Wastell 
and White, 2012), exposure to and enthusiasm for neuroscience was especially clear within the 
focus group convened with members of a foster care association. One respondent described 
attending
[a] training course […] where it spoke about children who suffered severe trauma in early life, that the 
different parts of their brains don’t wire – my technical terms aren’t as good as F2! – up as a child who 
hasn’t suffered trauma, and how this impacts on behaviour. (F1, foster care professionals group)
Another discussed lectures and workshops she had been to in this area, framing these as events that 
had furthered her interest in the brain (and, indeed, stimulated her to accept our invitation to join a 
focus group). In particular, she recalled a seminar in which the brains of ‘normal’ 
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versus ‘traumatised’ children were shown together, and described how “the power of the brain is 
just fascinating” (F2, foster care professionals group). Thus, even when the participants were not 
entirely certain about the information they were presented with, images of “traumatised and 
neglected” brains had a compelling rhetorical force that appeared to concretise ‘lay’ ideas about 
cerebral changes, and, following hybridisation with ‘expert’ neuroscientific knowledge, embedded 
these within professional education. For example, F1 (foster care professionals group) found the 
courses she attended valuable in that the neuroscientific content
kind of explained it [her professional experiences] a bit better. Because I think sometimes when you’re 
dealing with these difficult behaviours day in and day out as our carers do, it’s quite easy to forget the 
reasons behind it, and I thought that was a really nice way of explaining it. (F1, foster care professionals 
group)
For the individuals taking part in this particular focus group, the opportunities for personal and 
health improvement that scientific discourses on neuroplasticity implied were especially provoca-
tive, suggesting new possibilities that might benefit a variety of individuals:
[T]hat lecture that we went to [gestures to co-worker], the neuroplasticity, it was interesting because it was 
saying, like, the model that hearing is stored here, and that’s stored there, they’ve tried to kind of map out 
the brain, and that doesn’t really stand up now because when one part is damaged another part seems to be 
able to take over the functions. (F2, foster care professionals group)
Counsellors too noted the (potential) utility of neuroscience in enhancing their practice through 
its empirical claims regarding the negative changes to the brain that might result from traumatic 
experiences. As one participant described:
[T]he main thing for me really, in the work that I do, is the stuff around trauma and how you know the 
pathways get broken and […] how you can kind of re-forge those links and re-process trauma and get it 
put into the right part of the brain. All of that’s useful, I think; and there are useful ways of working with 
clients that, that are traumatised, and that can really help. (F3, counsellors group)
Research on the changing brain was also judged to be important in that it buttressed the episte-
mological claims of these professionals against those who might question their expertise. This was 
valuable for the participants working within foster care, who felt that they were regularly called 
upon to publicly justify their practice and the expertise structuring it:
[W]hat we deal with in social care which isnae a’ exact science, and people sometimes who don’t work 
within that sector find it hard to believe, and hard to accept when you’re trying to explain behaviours. (F1, 
foster care professionals group)
A key mechanism through which neuroscientific knowledge “explained” professional experi-
ence was through the situating of older, psychosocial perspectives within a neurobiological frame-
work. Attachment theory, which has origins in psychoanalysis and developmental psychology, is a 
key example of this:
The way that [the foster care organisation] […] is beginning to organise its post-approval training very 
much ties up the ideas of trauma and loss, processing and attachment ideas, so our carers are introduced in 
pre-approval training to, to the idea that brain development will be affected by, by trauma and loss. And 
certainly I think as a profession we’re much clearer, I think because of some of these images, about the 
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visible connection between early, early experiences and behaviour and development. So yeah, and 
especially we’re much more fluid with the idea now how damaging neglect is, for example, whereas ten 
years ago we thought it was, that we needed much more to be worried about physical and sexual abuse. 
(M1, foster care professionals group)
Yet, from the focus group discussion, it was not apparent that practice per se had shifted in 
response to neuroscience, even if the concepts understood to structure and justify it had done. This 
issue is discernible within an exchange between two participants in the focus group with 
counsellors:
F1:  I suppose what I, what I wonder is that if you don’t know anything about neuroscience is 
it possible that just the way that you do-the way that I do person-centred counselling, is 
that alone, you know, if there can be an improvement in the client just through that alone 
without, without any of this [brain research]?
F3:  Absolutely, ’cause when I started working I didn’t know anything about neuroscience. I just 
did what I do. It was more just kind of learning it as we went along, and holding an aware-
ness […] rather than any kind of specific ‘well, we’re working this way because of that’.
For F3, neuroscience research is “like a framework for thinking about something. But it’s not the 
whole story.” F1 thought similarly, remarking: “I don’t think neuroscience would ever completely, 
like take over and be, like, the be all and end all.” The notion that neuroscience is somehow signifi-
cant, but still marginal, to the concerns of professionals also became clear in the foster care focus 
group, when one participant noted:
[T]he most useful thing to do is that we spend most of our time supporting carers or working with teachers. 
Rather than having debates about neuroscience. (M1 foster care professionals group)
The data presented in this sub-section underscores how scientific discourses concerning the chang-
ing brain become hybridised and embedded within some kinds of professional learning to help justify 
current theory and practice; it also suggests that neurobiological research is perhaps (and only to 
some slight extent) redirecting the concerns of foster care workers (at least, in the eyes of these par-
ticipants). As indicated by the excited comments of F2 (foster care professionals group) in response 
to neuroscientific imagery, the focal power of brain scans as a means of conveying complex neuro-
logic concepts and statistical data through a relatively simple, brightly coloured ‘picture’ might, we 
suggest, be regarded as having import for any shifts that are occurring (cf. Dumit, 2004). Such images 
are encountered through meetings, training and the popular media. Nevertheless, in spite of the ‘mag-
netic appeal’ (Joyce, 2008) of biomedical images and the information they are often deemed to con-
vey, it is not clear that professional interest in the neurological represents a full ‘neuroscientific turn’ 
(Littlefield and Johnson, 2012). Whilst neurologic perspectives help to frame and justify practice, 
they are used by those who took part in this research “a little bit more loosely than the kind of formal, 
formal ideas” (M1, foster care professionals group). Neuroscientific ideas about (for instance) the 
plasticity of the brain cannot be presumed to translate unproblematically into professional praxis: 
they must be actively and selectively put to work, and may be reshaped in the process.
Professional scepticism
As we have seen, ideas about brain changes were important to some of the professionals who par-
ticipated in this research. Yet, scepticism with regards to knowledge claims was also in evidence. 
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This dialectic between engagement and scepticism was most apparent within discussion about 
education, and hence especially clear in the focus group conducted with teachers (thus, that dataset 
is a particular focus of this sub-section).
The teachers who participated in this research commented on how “talk about exercising your 
brain” (F1, teachers group) was “a bit of a theme at the moment” (this was also noted by various 
other participants, including some of the scientists). Discourses of changing and improving the 
brain through computer games and other tools aimed at cognitive enhancement, or preventing 
cognitive decline, were viewed as “becoming more popular” (F1, teachers group) within not only 
education but also wider culture. Examples were given of articles in “women’s magazines about 
keeping your brain active” (F2, teachers group) and special segments on popular television 
programmes.
For the teachers, the idea that the brain could change through the life-course was a serious 
business that they were exposed to through educational guidance and recommendations. For 
instance, they noted guidance received on ‘Brain Gym’ (a controversial programme through 
which students are encouraged to carry out specific movements in order to enhance cognitive 
function). Yet, the principles of Brain Gym were not regarded as translating well into classroom 
practice. As one participant remarked, although some of his colleagues employed Brain Gym 
techniques, many “people will go away all enthused for a couple of weeks and do things, and 
then forget about it” (M1, teachers group). This is suggestive of both the compelling nature of 
ideas connected with the brain, and the degree to which these are not unique but instead merely 
one of many cultural enchantments that can be experimented with by social actors and then set 
aside.
Even when teachers feel directed to undertake activities such as Brain Gym in the classroom, 
doubts about the facility of these to enhance learning through changing and developing neural 
pathways endured. M1 (teachers group) stated that he had “distanced” himself from it, whilst 
another participant (F2) in the discussion reflected that she had once read that it had been “decried” 
as “a load of old twoddle”. Such ‘distance’ can of course be regarded, in part, as a consequence of 
the everyday exigencies of the workplace, although this is not incommensurable with the possibili-
ties that the neurologic ontology Brain Gym seeks to perform does not resonate with teachers’ own 
understandings of how individuals learn and change. M1 also constructed ‘distance’ between the 
professions and academic neuroscientific research. He noted that his most likely contact with neu-
roscience would be “an article in the Times Educational Supplement for example, which is written 
about a piece of research which has been reported [in] such and such”. As M1 put it, there “are very 
few teachers who go out and read all the neuroscience on brains, come back into the classroom and 
do it. It doesn’t happen that way”.
A participant in one of the focus groups conducted with neuroscientists noted that “all my fam-
ily are teachers and a lot of people I know are teachers” (F2, neuroscientists group 1) and that “my 
stuff [research] relates to development in children”. Acting as an informant, she reflected on the 
topicality of neuroscience within education, but also the challenges to her expertise (which was 
seen as having relevance to education) and the ‘distance’ between neuroscientific laboratory 
research and teaching practice that could be constructed:
You know, they’ll have a different view than I do and that’s the case, so I don’t think they see you 
necessarily as an expert on something that they know nothing about. It’s much more of a two way street 
whenever I’ve talked to teachers about things. They’re really interested but… Yeah, and I guess a lot of the 
stuff, at this stage it doesn’t directly apply to them in the classroom so it’s useful to have that, that kind of 
interaction with them but, yeah, I don’t think they see it as something that’s necessarily kind of directly 
impacts directly on what they do.
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The reaction she reports overlaps closely with the content and nature of the discussion that occurred 
with the focus group with teachers described above. Such comments do not necessarily reflect 
professional resistance to (neuro)science per se, although they do highlight a lack of time and inter-
est in ideas of brain training, linked to scepticism about its utility (cf. Pickersgill, 2011) and a 
deliberate positioning of it outside the perimeters of the ‘zones of relevance’ (Schütz, 1946) salient 
to the participants.
5. Conclusion
The emergence of neuroplasticity discourse has been compelling to many who work within bio-
medicine (Rees, 2010; Rubin, 2009). At the same time, these ideas have found traction within a 
range of popular media (Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Thornton, 2011). As Prior notes in his work on neuro-
logical disorders, “what lay people recognise and report upon is change, and not disease” (2003: 
48). The changes that many of the patient participants in this study recognised in themselves (which 
were often negative, but occasionally positive) sometimes directed their attention towards ‘popular 
neuroscience’ which appeared to be validated not (solely) through the authoritative voice of scien-
tific experts, but with regard to their embodied, lived experience. New scientific discourses of 
brain plasticity provided one framework for articulating lived experience, but other biomedical 
vocabularies (e.g. endocrinological frames) were also employed.
The promissory aspect to scientific findings around plasticity and similar claims regarding the 
changeable nature of the brain within popular neuroscience (as discussed in the introduction) is 
reflected in (and perhaps in part produced by) professional activities (e.g. training) experienced by 
some of our participants, especially those working within education and social care. Here, for 
instance, neuroplasticity research offers up hope that children who have experienced trauma can be 
‘normalised’ through educational and care practices; based on our data and wider research, we sug-
gest that the authorisation for such science comes from care workers’ experience watching such 
children grow into ‘adjusted’, ‘healthy’ members of society. In the process, older ideas about the 
psychology of learning and behavioural development appear to be reframed, at least partially, 
within a neurobiological idiom. This at once legitimises existing practice, whilst also potentially 
redirecting it (e.g. towards a focus on neglect in foster caring).
Within the data presented we also see traces of scepticism regarding the promise of plasticity. 
Here and more generally, for patients this may manifest as a careful managing of expectations: 
hopes formed in order to assert control and certainty over the biographical disruption of serious 
neurological disorders (Browner and Preloran, 2010) and carefully weighed up against the need for 
prudence in order to protect against the subjective distress of profound disappointment should 
expected therapeutic advances fail to materialise. Likewise, for professionals (especially, teach-
ers), experience of everyday work and familiarity with its rhythms, challenges and restrictions may 
create scepticism and even distrust (cf. Pickersgill, 2011). In this respect, whilst the concept of 
brain plasticity has been understood as a tool of governance (cf. Thornton, 2011), we regard it here 
as a window through which to better appreciate how individuals ascribe significance to and con-
struct interest in ‘new’ (scientific) knowledge (particularly as an explanatory framework for extant 
professional practices and observations, which are then further authenticated in the process).
The data on which our analysis draws is deliberately diverse in order to explore some of the 
heterogeneity of contemporary engagements with ideas about the brain. Further, as noted in our 
methodology section, it samples populations who were expected to have some pre-existing interest 
in neuroscience – and a different sampling strategy might have yielded different results. Yet, based 
on our data, we can nevertheless make conceptual reflections that can be explored in future work, 
using a range of case studies. In particular, we suggest that scientific knowledge on its own is 
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insufficient to transform conceptualisations of selfhood or remake professional practice. Perhaps 
more important is the degree to which research (and its popular instantiations and translations) is 
congruent with individuals’ everyday experiences. Of course, scientific constructs, such as ideas 
about the brain, do filter into and shape contemporary culture and potentially provide new ways of 
explaining experience that might ultimately become taken-for-granted means of comprehending 
the world and subjective experience. However, for this to occur, we submit that any changes must 
necessarily emerge from a reciprocal interaction between the lived experience of embodied indi-
viduals, existing cultural frames, and prominent scientific discourses. Such processes are complex, 
and likely do not proceed with the immediacy implied by some of the more hyperbolic claims 
regarding the intrinsic import of (neuro)science for how we understand our selves.
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